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Summary
This paper develops a mathematical model for cognitive performance of a tactical air traffic
controller in an en-route ATC context. The aim of this model-based approach is to enable the
evaluation of both accident risk and aspects like cognitive workload and effectiveness of ATC
in managing air traffic situations safely. Use is made of human error modelling, Hollnagel’s
cognitive mode model and Wickens Multiple Resources model. The paper describes how these
psychological sub-models are combined into a single model of ATCo cognitive performance,
and how the interaction of these human sub-models with the technical sub-systems is brought
into account.
The model is applied to an exemplary ATM scenario which consists of two parallel lanes of
opposite direction traffic at the same flight level, and where the air traffic controller has no
automation support tools like Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) or Flight Path Monitoring. The
obtained results for this conventional ATC situation are compared to those previously obtained
under the hypothetical assumption that a tactical air traffic controller reacts to aircraft deviations
in case of an STCA alert only.
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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a mathematical model for
cognitive performance of a tactical air traffic
controller in an en-route ATC context. The aim of
this model-based approach is to enable the
evaluation of both accident risk and aspects like
cognitive workload and effectiveness of ATC in
managing air traffic situations safely. Use is made of
human error modelling, Hollnagel’s cognitive mode
model and Wickens Multiple Resources model. The
paper describes how these psychological sub-models
are combined into a single model of ATCo cognitive
performance, and how the interaction of these
human sub-models with the technical sub-systems is
brought into account.
The model is applied to an exemplary ATM scenario
which consists of two parallel lanes of opposite
direction traffic at the same flight level, and where
the air traffic controller has no automation support
tools like Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) or
Flight Path Monitoring. The obtained results for this
conventional ATC situation are compared to those
previously obtained under the hypothetical
assumption that a tactical air traffic controller reacts
to aircraft deviations in case of an STCA alert only.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Safety based ATM design
Over decades, the aviation industry has been able to
compensate the increase in traffic with a decrease in
accident risk per flight hour. In view of the rapid
growth of air traffic and the technological and
organizational complexity of it, this has been a
major accomplishment. Unfortunately, the point has
been reached where it is unclear how to continue
such compensation. The reason is that in the past the
decrease of risk per flight hour has come in large
part from technology driven improvements of safety.
The effect of this technology-driven approach is
shown through the accident statistics; they reveal
that the relative share of human related causes is
some eighty percent. This means that the historical
air traffic safety compensation process can be
continued if one learns to understand how the human
and procedure related accidents could be reduced.
This should be accomplished by learning the
principles behind human related accident causes in
aviation.
*) This research has been performed at NLR within a series of
projects with support from the European Commission and the
Netherlands CAA (RLD).
If we would try to understand these principles on the
basis of an evaluation of incidents and accidents
alone, then several difficulties arise. The number of
incidents and accidents is limited, while the
situations that caused them are quite complex and
reports are not free from discussion. Due to the
limited availability of data and the questionable
validity of data, statistical analysis alone is not
sufficient to model safety in complex situations with
multiple human involvement. By now there is a
broad consensus that appropriate safety models are
needed to understand the mechanisms behind the
remaining accident risk in relation to separation
criteria and near-misses (Cohen & Hockaday, 1998).
It is also recognized that such a safety modelling
approach should be useful in optimizing advanced
ATM operations (Haraldsdottir et al., 1997), (Odoni
et al., 1997), (Wickens et al., 1998).
1.2 ATM safety modelling
Most existing studies on ATM safety either focus on
hazard analysis techniques or on collision risk
analysis: studies with thorough hazard analysis
results generally use simplified collision risk
models, advanced studies on collision risk between
aircraft usually do not take into account hazards or
non-nominal events (except in adapted tails of
probability density functions). It appears that most
established techniques fall short in integrating
hazard analysis techniques with advanced collision
risk analysis techniques. In a series of studies, at
NLR this problem has been addressed with the
development of a accident risk assessment
methodology and supporting evaluation tool-set
(both named TOPAZ) that takes an integral
approach towards ATM safety assessment (Blom et
al., 1998). Recently it has also been shown how this
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approach effectively supports safety management
and the building of modern Safety Cases for
advanced operations in ATM (Blom et al., 1999).
At the basis of the TOPAZ approach lies the use of
a very general class of mathematical models for
describing the ATM process. The models used are
hybrid state Markov processes, which allow to
describe stochastic evolution of both continuous and
discrete variables over time. This means that e.g.
both aircraft 3D position and velocity and operator
states can be described as a function of time,
including their interactions and the effects of
probabilistic disturbances. To accomplish this,
existing and newly developed models, such as
Generalised Reich collision risk model (Bakker &
Blom, 1993) and high level Petri Net model
(Everdij et al., 1997a), were combined in order to
model and evaluate ATM operations on safety.
In parallel with its development the TOPAZ
methodology, is applied to a variety of accident risk
assessment studies, e.g. converging runways
(Everdij et al., 1996), free flight equipped aircraft
(Daams et al., 1998a, 1999a) and wake vortex
induced accident risk (Kos et al., 2000). Another
type of application considered is conventional en-
route traffic in a scenario of two parallel opposite
direction lanes. In (Everdij et al., 1997b), for this
scenario, risk has been evaluated under two
operational concepts. In the first concept, named
‘No ATC’ there is no ATC surveillance of the traffic
at all, in the second concept, named ‘STCA-only
based ATC’, the tactical air traffic controller sends
deviating aircraft back to their lane if and only if
there has been an STCA alert. Although the
demonstrated possibility to obtain accident risk
results for such complex operations as ATM is quite
promising in itself, several operational experts
pointed out that an STCA-only based ATC concept
is overly conservative as a representation of
conventional ATM concepts, since e.g. routine
monitoring and anticipation is not incorporated.
Therefore the follow-up was to develop an
appropriate human performance model for risk
assessments of such routine monitoring situations.
1.3 Human performance modelling
A crucial issue in ATM safety assessment is how the
human factor is incorporated into the risk model.
Hence there is a clear need for a modelling approach
to assess and understand accident risk in relation to
the performance of the human operators involved.
This means that appropriate human performance
models are required that describe human cognitive
and responsibility principles up to the level of
accident risk. This paper aims to present the
developments of such a human
cognition/performance model for a tactical
controller within the context of conventional en-
route ATC, and is based on a series of studies (Buck
et al., 1996; Biemans and Daams, 1997; Daams et
al., 1998b, 1999b). The resulting set of
mathematical models is named HOMEROS (Human
Operator Model to Evaluate Reliability Organisation
and Safety).
At present, the view on human reliability has shifted
from a context-free error centred approach, in which
unreliability is modeled as failures of human
information processing, towards a contextual
perspective in which human actions are the product
of human internal states, strategies and the
environment, (Amalberti & Wioland, 1997)
(Hollnagel, 1993), (Bainbridge, 1993). From this
viewpoint, safety critical human actions should be
modelled in their relation to the other activities of
the operator and the environment. Thus for a proper
description of human reliability it is necessary to
include the cognitive processes that underlie the
operator actions. As a result, one obtains a
comprehensive model of the operator performing his
job.
The main benefits expected from contextual models
for safety assessment is that they provide better
feedback to designers and that they remove the need
to use overly conservative individual sub-models of
relevant operator actions which may complicate
understanding of how safety is achieved in aviation.
1.4 Organisation of this paper
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2
provides the background of three complementary
psychological models on which human cognitive
performance modelling in this paper is based. In
Section 3 we explain how these three psychological
models are jointly used in a mathematical human
cognition/ performance model for a tactical en-route
controller. This is largely done on the basis of
human factors ATC expertise. Next, in Section 4 this
mathematical model is reduced to a simpler model
on the basis of clearly defined model aggregation
steps. In Section 5, the reduced human
cognition/performance model is used to evaluate a
conventional en-route ATC situation w.r.t. accident
risk and air traffic controller actions. Finally, in
Section 6 we discuss the results obtained.
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2. HUMAN MODELLING APPROACHES
The mathematical human performance/reliability
model development in this paper is based on the
following three complementary psychological
models:
- Multiple Resources Model
- Contextual Control Mode Model
- Human Error Modelling
In this section we outline these three psychological
models. One should be aware that several other
psychological human error type of models exist that
have potential application in ATM, see e.g. (Isaac &
Ruitenberg, 1999).
2.1 Multiple resources model
The main reference used here is (Wickens, 1992).
The multiple resource model reflects the idea that
humans have several different mental capacities with
resource properties. In this view, task interference
depends on the extent to which tasks use the same
resources: two difficult tasks may be time-shared
easily if they use different types of resources. The
multiple resources approach has been well
developed both for military applications (AGARD,
1998) and for ATM (e.g. Corker et al., 1997; Kilner
et al., 1997). The principal idea behind the model is
that human cognitive effort can be divided over
several activities. This is called the resources
metaphor, (Norman & Bobrow, 1975). Since human
cognitive effort is limited, the resources metaphor
may readily account for failures in time-sharing
between competing activities. The underlying
assumption of the resources metaphor is that the
human is an information processing system with
limited processing capacity. The model focusses on
how this limited processing capacity can be used to
time-share several processing tasks.
When two or more tasks are to be successfully time-
shared, the first important aspects are the efficient
scheduling and switching between activities. If
sufficient time is available, the operator can occupy
himself with one task at a time, although this does
not necessarily mean that the tasks are performed
sequentially. However, if the available time is not
sufficient to apply this strategy, concurrent task
performance becomes necessary. With respect to
concurrent task performance, Wickens mentions
three performance influencing task characteristics:
Confusion When an element of one task is similar
to an element of a concurrently performed other
task, the elements may become confused, leading
to a decrease in performance.
Cooperation In some cases, the similarity between
performance routines for elements of two tasks
leads to cooperation between the routines. It is
even possible that the two task elements can be
merged into one new task.
Difficulty The task difficulty highly influences
whether a second task can be performed
concurrently.
The confusion and cooperation aspects are closely
related: both emerge from the similarity between
tasks. However, cooperation is associated with
similar processing routines whereas confusion
emerges from similar input material. By taking into
account the confusion and cooperation aspects of
concurrent task performance leads to multiple
resources dimensions.
Multiple resources dimensions
On the basis of a large number of dual-task studies,
Wickens proposes a three dimensional resource
quantity, with dichotomous dimensions. The
dimensions are:
Information processing stages Dimension with
early and central processing on the one extreme
(sensory processing, encoding and perception of
stimuli) and late processing on the other (deciding
on the best response and its execution). For
example, the requirement for an air traffic controller
to give a response to each change in aircraft state
(late processing) is predicted not to disrupt the
ability to maintain an accurate mental model of the
radar display (early processing).
Modalities Input modalities differentiate between
the encoding of auditory and visually presented
stimuli. It is easier to divide attention between the
eye and ear than between two auditory or two visual
stimuli. Response modes refer to the choice between
a vocal and a manual response. The reason that
manual and vocal outputs can be efficiently time-
shared is probably due to the separation of spatial
and verbal information processing resources
(manual responses are spatial in nature, while vocal
ones are verbal).
Processing codes Human controllers can rely on
two working memory codes, namely a spatial and a
verbal one. Each is used to process or retain
qualitatively different kinds of information (spatial
and visual versus temporal, verbal and phonetic) and
each can be disrupted by different concurrent
activities. Resources underlying spatial processing
and left-hand control reside predominantly in the
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right hemisphere of the brain. Resources underlying
verbal processing, speech-responses and right-hand
control reside more in the left hemisphere.
A note should be made about the modality
dimension. In (Wickens, 1989) it is pointed out that
the resources metaphor does not readily apply to
input modality. Instead, pre-emption and attention-
switching seem to dominate cross-modal time-
sharing. However, these effects are relatively small
in comparison to the effort required for the extra
scanning activity that is generally involved with
intra-modal time-sharing.
spatial
verbal
anal. 
pict. 
printed 
text
speech
pitch
visual
auditory
encoding
central 
processing responding
spatial
verbal
vocal
manual
responses
information processing 
stages
input 
modalities
processing 
codes
Figure 1: Proposed structure of resource dimensions
(free after [Wickens, 1992]).
Figure 1 is a representation of the multiple resources
theory. Although the theory does not pretend to
account for all influences on multiple-task
performance and time-sharing, research showed that
the identified dimensions account for a reasonably
large proportion of these influences and can be used
in predicting task interference. Ideally, the loads on
the dimensions must be established a priori. Input
modalities are easy to define, as are vocal and
manual output modes. Information processing stages
and processing codes will cause more problems.
Sometimes task analysis can reveal memory
requirements.
We can now model the operators ability of time-
sharing by evaluating which resources are used
during the simultaneous execution of the tasks.
Heavy concurrent demands upon the same resource
then reduce time-sharing, whereas tasks using
different resources can be time-shared easily.
However, the Wickens model does not further
describe this.
2.2 Contextual control mode model
A major trend in human performance modelling is
the Cognitive Viewpoint, (Hollnagel, 1993). Within
this approach, human behaviour is looked upon as a
cyclic process, where human action is determined as
much by the context as by inherent traits and
mechanisms of human cognition. In this view
humans do not passively react to events, they
actively look for information and act based on
intentions as well as external developments.
This approach in human performance modelling is
in accordance with concepts from ecological
psychology. Ecological psychology studies the
information transaction between living systems and
their environments, especially as they pertain to the
perceived significance of environmental situations
for the planning and execution of purposive
behaviour (Gibson, 1986).
Based on the cognitive viewpoint, as stated above,
Hollnagel (1993) describes a new approach that
focuses on different control modes of the human
operator’s cognition, which reflect different control
strategies in operator behaviour.
Control modes
The specific four control modes that are described
by Hollnagel (1993) characterise in more detail
regions of the continuum of control and can be
specified as follows:
Scrambled Scrambled control denotes the case
where the choice of the next action is completely
unpredictable or random. The scrambled control
mode constitutes the extreme situation of zero
control.
Opportunistic Opportunistic control corresponds to
the case when the next action is chosen from the
current context alone, and mainly based on
salient features rather than on more durable
intentions or goals. It is opportunistic in the
sense that the operator takes a chance, not
because he is deliberately exploring an
alternative, but because there is no time or
possibility to do anything better.
Tactical Tactical control is characteristic for
situations where the operator’s performance is
based on some kind of planning. Hence, the
operator more or less follows a known procedure
or rule. The planning is limited of scope and/or
limited of range, and the needs taken into
account may sometimes be ad hoc.
Strategic Strategic control means that the operator
is considering the global context, i.e. using a
wider event-horizon and looking ahead at higher
level goals: either those which have been
suspended and have to be resumed or those
which, according to experience and expectations,
may appear in the near future. This mode should
provide a more efficient and robust performance.
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An obvious question that arises is what determines
the degree of control an operator has of a situation in
a particular control mode and how the control mode
changes. These topics are discussed next.
Control mode characteristics
In the Hollnagel approach, the control mode model
consists of a high-level description of human
behaviour, rather than a description of human tasks
like planning, monitoring and decision making. To
stress the high level character of these activities,
they will be called meta-activities. Following
Hollnagel (1993) the following four meta-activities
are briefly elaborated upon below:
- Number of simultaneous goals
- Availability of plans
- Event horizon
- Mode of execution
Number of simultaneous goals This variable
describes whether the operator considers only a
single goal at a time or whether possible actions
from multiple goals are considered. It is not the
same as considering multiple choices or actions that
may lead to the same goal (i.e. evaluating the effects
of several possible lines of action, such as different
ways of avoiding a conflict).
Availability of plans This variable describes
whether the operator can refer to predefined or pre-
existing plans (action templates) as a basis for
choosing the next action. A plan can either be made
on the spot, have been learned by experience, or
have been defined explicitly in advance, e.g. as a
written procedure. In either case, the availability of
plans requires that the situation is familiar. A plan
can either be followed rigidly or serve as a guideline
for actions to be taken.
Event horizon This variable refers to how much of
the past and how much of the future are taken into
consideration when a choice of action is being made.
The event horizon is described in terms of the
number of steps, moves or items that are considered,
rather than in subjective or objective time. The
extent of the past is referred to as the history size,
while the extent of the future is referred to as the
prediction length.
Mode of execution The mode of execution can vary
from feedforward to feedback driven. In the
feedforward driven execution the operator carries
out the steps of a chosen plan until either a
predefined checkpoint has been reached or until
external conditions force an interrupt. The better a
feed forward is, the longer the uninterrupted period
may continue. In the feedback driven execution each
step (or group of steps) is followed by the evaluation
of the feedback before the plan is continued. Even
with a feedback mode of execution there may be sets
of actions that are carried out in a feedforward way.
Thus feedforward and feedback modes of execution
define two ends of a continuum of possibilities.
Control mode changes
It is reasonable to assume that several factors will
determine how and when an operator’s control mode
changes from one to another. Two of the obvious
candidates that are described by Hollnagel are the
amount of subjectively available time and the
outcome of the previous action in terms of success
and failure. These two main control parameters are
briefly elaborated upon:
Subjectively available time This involves a
consideration of the number of activities that
remains to be carried out e.g. suspended actions, the
number of simultaneous goals, the predicted changes
and developments in the process and the
environment (hence ‘objective’ time), the level of
arousal, the level of familiarity of the situation, etc..
The estimation ranges from being quite detailed and
precise to guessing and gut feeling.
Determination of outcome (of previous actions)
This is not just a matter of ascertaining whether the
previous action succeeded or failed. On the contrary,
the determination of the outcome is different for
each control mode, and may vary between a
rudimentary detection of noticeable changes in the
scrambled mode to a detailed evaluation of the
feedback in the strategic mode. Complicating factors
are for example the possible delays in outcome (for
systems with large time constants), ambiguous or
incomplete state indications and equivocal rules for
interpretation.
2.3 Human Error Modelling
The main reference used here is (Kirwan, 1994). For
safety-critical operations like nuclear power plants,
it has been tried to take into account the human
factor in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
approaches. In general a PRA starts with an
identification of hazards that might compromise the
plant's safety. Next the propagation of the possible
consequences of the identified hazards through the
plant to the level of accidents is described.
Frequently, this is done by means of fault- and event
trees. After quantification of the frequency of
occurrence of the identified hazards, plant accident
-10-
NLR-TP-2001-053
risk are evaluated using the fault and/or event trees.
Human error modelling approaches consist of two
main elements: human error identification (HEI) and
human error probability (HEP) assessment. The
results of these then fit within the fault/event tree
analysis framework.
Human error identification
At the basis of human reliability modelling lies the
(structured) identification of human operator related
hazards. Generally, this involves a task analysis and
a human error analysis. During the task analysis, the
required operator actions during the various (sub-
)processes of the plant are identified. In this stage,
the equipment, interfaces, procedures and (trained)
skills that are related to these actions are also
identified.
After the task analysis, the HEI considers
systematically what can go wrong. Commonly, the
following types of errors are considered:
Error of omission Failing to carry out a required
action.
Error of commission Failing to carry out a required
act adequately: insufficient accuracy, wrong
timing, actions performed in a wrong sequence.
Extraneous action Unrequired act performed
instead of, or in addition to, required act.
Error-recovery opportunities Actions which can
recover previous errors.
Underlying the HEI is a taxonomy of human error.
As an example of a taxonomy of human error we
describe the framework of skill-, rule- and
knowledge-based behaviour, (Rasmussen, 1983), in
the next subsection.
Skill, rule, knowledge based taxonomy
In (Reason, 1990), human error is related to
cognitive processes that underlie human
performance. Here, the human operator is looked
upon as an information processor. The human
information processor receives stimuli from the
outside world, then processes these stimuli and
finally responds. In this framework, human error
emerges when during this scheme a deviation from
normal processing routine occurs. One of the more
influential models of human (erroneous)
performance is the Step Ladder model of Rasmussen
(1983). This model distinguishes three levels of
human information processing: Skill-based level,
Rule-based level and Knowledge-based level. These
levels induce the following taxonomy of human
errors:
Slips and Lapses Slips and lapses are unintended
deviations from planned actions due to execution
or memory failures.
Rule-based errors These are errors resulting from
erroneous intentions, due to the application of
bad rules or due to the misapplication of good
rules.
Knowledge-based errors These are errors due to
wrong reasoning about the to-be-controlled
process. These mistakes may emerge from wrong
or incomplete knowledge of the process or the
bounded rationality of the operator.
Human error probability assessment
The second step in human error modelling is to
quantify the probability of occurrence of the
identified errors, for which many methods exist. As
an example, we briefly describe the quantification
part of THERP (Technique for Human Error Rate
Prediction, see (Swain & Guttman, 1983)). Other
examples are SLIM (Success Likelihood Index
Methodology, (Embrey et al., 1984)) which relies
mainly on expert judgement or HEART (Human
Error Assessment and Reduction Technique,
(Williams, 1988)) which focusses on the effects of
identified Error-Producing Conditions.
3. MODELLING FOR EN-ROUTE ATC
The three psychological models of Section 2 are
now used to develop a single mathematical model of
a tactical en-route ATCo performing his job at a
high (cognitive) level. Detail is given only when
necessary. The model focuses on the following
aspects of the interaction between the controller and
the ATM process:
- Maintaining situational awareness
- Timely taking of safety critical actions
- Effectiveness of safety critical actions
- Occurrence of hazardous situations that involve
the controller
This section is organised as follows. First the tactical
controller task is described in terms of a suitable set
of subtasks. Subsequently, the performance of the
identified subtasks is related to the context in which
the tasks are performed. Next, the scheduling of
subtask performance is discussed, and it is explained
how clearance errors that are initiated by the
controller are incorporated. Finally the resulting
mathematical model is described.
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3.1 Description of controller task
The idea is to decompose the controller's task into
several subtasks. This decomposition has been
carried out along two dimensions: first a generic
dimension, where the task is decomposed into
cognitive activities at a general level which is
independent from the scenario and operational
concept. Secondly, the task is decomposed
according to a scenario/concept specific dimension,
where the controller task is described at the level of
operational functions in the scenario. This twofold
decomposition of the controller task allows
flexibility in incorporating detail into the model: in
this set-up we can restrict detail in the task
description along the scenario/concept specific
dimension to subtasks relevant for the problem
under consideration, while the over-all interaction
between controller and ATM process may still be
properly modelled using the task description at the
generic dimension.
First, a task decomposition along the generic
dimension has been identified from (Buck et al.,
1996). The resulting subtasks originate in (Jackson,
1989), however in (Buck et al., 1996) it was merged
with several existing task-analyses (Ammerman et
al., 1987), (Cox, 1994), (EATCHIP, 1996),
(Endsley & Rodgers, 1994). The following subtasks
resulted:
1. Sensing (to gather all information which is
needed to get an overview over the air traffic
situation).
2. Integration (to connect the gathered information
thus forming a more global air traffic picture).
3. Prediction (to use the more global picture to
anticipate future situations and events).
4. Complementary communication (pass the
information to aircraft in order to improve the
pilots understanding of the situation).
5. ATC problem solving planning (to use the
understanding gained from the more global
perspective to plan and prioritise aircraft
actions).
6. Executive action (to communicate information
and priorities as instructions to the aircraft in the
system).
7. Rule monitoring (to ensure that the active
components of the system behave in accordance
with the ‘rules’; monitoring and taking corrective
actions for exceptions).
8. Co-ordination (to coordinate laterally with other
parts of the ATC organisation).
9. Over-all performance (to ensure that the
objectives of the operation are achieved, and that
the infrastructure functions correctly).
10. Maintenance and monitoring of non-human part
(to ensure that all systems supporting the
controller work correctly).
Secondly, subtasks are also defined along the en-
route ATC specific dimensions, where attention is
focused on safety critical actions in the definition of
the subtasks. This leads to the identification of three
en-route context specific tasks:
A. Anticipate for aircraft deviating from intentions.
B. React to Automation alerts.
C. Perform other control activities.
We are now in the following position: the ATCo's
task has been decomposed into subtasks along two
dimensions: one relating the task to generic
cognitive activities and the other dimension relating
the task to specific situations in the scenario and
operational concept considered. We next identified
the task overlap across the dimensions in Table 1.
This leads to 19 combinations across the
dimensions, and thus a decomposition into 19
combined ATCo subtasks.
Table 1: Task overlap across the generic cognitive
activities and the en-route ATC specific tasks
A. Anticipate B. Alerts C. Others
1. Sensing X X
2. Integration X X
3. Prediction X X
4. Complementary
communication
X
5. Problem solving/
planning
X X X
6. Executive action X X X
7. Rule monitoring X X X
8. Coordination X
9. Overall
performance
X
10. Maintenance X
3.2 Task performance and control modes
In modelling the influence of the context on
performance we adopt a mathematical model that
incorporates two control modes: tactical control and
opportunistic control. In
 we identify the characteristic influence of these
control modes on the performance of the A and B
subtasks.
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Since we may look upon subtasks C as representing
a range of subtasks other than A and B along the en-
route ATC specific dimension, it suffices to describe
differences in tactical and opportunistic control
mode at a general level only (see Daams et al.,
1998b).
Table 2: Subtasks related to Anticipation and Alerts
 A1 Sensing:
Tactical: Whenever possible the controller scans his
display to detect possible deviations from ATC
intentions. The controller divides the display into
regions of interest and assesses these regions in a
particular order. If scanning is interrupted at some
time instant, the controller will resume scanning
starting at the region that he was scanning when the
interruption took place. Further information may also
be obtained through R/T communication.
Opportunistic: Whenever possible the controller
scans his display to detect possible deviations. The
controller scans in a random fashion.
 A2 Integration:
Tactical: The ATCo systematically integrates the
information derived from scanning to improve his
mental picture of the traffic situation. When some
relevant information is not available, the ATCo may
return to sensing to actively seek information to
improve his assessment of the situation.
Opportunistic: The ATCo integrates the randomly
obtained information. An incomplete or even
distorted mental picture may develop.
 A3 Prediction:
Tactical: The ATCo extrapolates his mental picture
to the future traffic situation. On the basis of the
assessment of the situation, the ATCo decides
whether a problem may occur in the mid-term
future.
Opportunistic: The assessment of the future
situation is restricted to a short time horizon and is
based on incomplete information. It is assessed
whether a problem may be expected in the short-
term future.
 A5 Problem solving/planning:
Tactical: On the basis of the assessment of the
(future) situation, the ATCo decides a resolution to
the expected problem. In principle, the resolution
involves replanning the aircraft trajectories in an
optimal fashion with respect to safety, efficiency.
Opportunistic: The resolution is aimed at solving
the imminent problem only.
 A6 Executive action:
Tactical: The controller gives a series of R/T
instructions to the aircraft involved. He verifies
whether the pilot(s) readback these instructions
correctly.
Opportunistic: The verification of correct readback
may be omitted.
Rule monitoring: A7
Tactical: After the R/T communication the
controller verifies whether the aircraft comply to his
clearances.
Opportunistic: This may be omitted or be performed
less thoroughly.
 B5 Problem solving/planning:
Tactical: On the basis of the assessment of the
situation, the ATCo decides a resolution for the
conflict. The resolution may range from vectoring
both aircraft to doing nothing.
Opportunistic: Same as in tactical control mode
 B6 Executive action:
Tactical: The controller gives the necessary R/T
instructions to the aircraft involved. He verifies
whether the pilots readback these instructions
correctly.
Opportunistic: The verification of correct readback
may be omitted.
 B7 Rule monitoring:
Tactical: After the R/T communication the
controller verifies whether the aircraft comply to his
clearance.
Opportunistic: Monitoring may be done less
thoroughly or even be omitted.
3.3 Scheduling of subtasks
In this subsection the scheduling strategy applied
will be defined for the subtasks. The scheduling
strategy is expressed in the following (input) task
parameters:
Pre-emption For each subtask an assumption is
made whether it may pre-empt another subtask.
Concurrency For each subtask it is known whether
it may be performed concurrently with another
subtask.
Initiation For each subtask the circumstances under
which the subtask should be performed are
known.
The assumptions concerning Pre-emption and
Concurrency are implemented according to Tables 3
and 4. These tables have been identified on the basis
of ATC human factors expert knowledge.
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Table 3: Concurrent performance of subtasks
A1 A2 A3 A5 A6 A7 B5 B6 B7
A1 - y y y n y n n y
A2 y - y y n y n n y
A3 y y - y n y n n y
A5 y y y - n y y n y
A6 n n n n - n n n n
A7 y y y y n - n n y
B5 n n n y n n - n n
B6 n n n n n n n - n
B7 y y y y n y n n -
C1 y y y y n y n n y
C2 y y y y n y n n y
C3 y y y y n y n n y
C4 y y n n n y n n y
C5 y y y y n y y n y
C6 y y n n n y n n n
C7 y y y y n y n n y
C8 y y n n n y n n y
C9 y y y y n y n n y
C10 y y y y n y n n y
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
A1 y y y y y y y y y y
A2 y y y y y y y y y y
A3 y y y n y n y n y y
A5 y y y n y n y n y y
A6 n n n n n n n n n n
A7 y y y y y y y y y y
B5 n n n n y n n n n n
B6 n n n n n n n n n n
B7 y y y y y n y y y y
C1 - y y y y y y y y y
C2 y - y y y y y y y y
C3 y y - n y n y n y y
C4 y y n - n n y n y y
C5 y y y n - n y n y y
C6 y y n n n - y n y y
C7 y y y y y y - y y y
C8 y y n n n n y - y y
C9 y y y y y y y y - y
C10 y y y y y y y y y -
Tables 3 and 4 should be read as follows. Consider
subtasks C4 (general communication) and A3
(prediction with respect to deviations). It follows
from Table 3 that these two subtasks can not be
performed concurrently. Next inspect the row C4 in
Table 4 at the collum corresponding to A3, we see
that C4 pre-empts A3. Thus if A3 is carried out and
C4 is initiated, execution of A3 will stop and C4 will
be performed first. If concurrent performance were
possible (i.e. there would be a ‘y’ in Table 3), then
pre-emption would mean that C4 and A3 are
performed concurrently, with C4 as the primary and
A3 as the secondary task. In terms of a stack of to-
be-performed subtasks this scheduling principle can
be formulated generically as the following two rules:
Rule 1: An initiated subtask will be placed in the
stack before the subtasks that it may pre-
empt.
Rule 2: If the first two subtasks of the stack can be
processed concurrently, this will be done
(subtask duration will be slightly longer,
however).
Table 4: Pre-emption between subtasks
A1 A2 A3 A5 A6 A7 B5 B6 B7
A1 - n n n n n n n n
A2 n - n n n n n n n
A3 n n - n n n n n n
A5 A5 A5 A5 - n A5 n n A5
A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 - A6 n n A6
A7 n n n n n - n n n
B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 n B5 - n B5
B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 - B6
B7 n n n n n n n n -
C1 n n n n n n n n n
C2 n n n n n n n n n
C3 n n n n n n n n n
C4 C4 C4 C4 n n n n n n
C5 n n n n n n n n n
C6 C6 C6 C6 n n C6 n n C6
C7 n n n n n n n n n
C8 C8 C8 C8 n n n n n n
C9 n n n n n n n n n
C10 n n n n n n n n n
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10
A1 n n n n n n n n n n
A2 n n n n n n n n n n
A3 n n n n n n n n n n
A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5 A5
A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6 A6
A7 n n n n n n n n n n
B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5 B5
B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6 B6
B7 n n n n n n n n n n
C1 - n n n n n n n n n
C2 n - n n n n n n n n
C3 n n - n n n n n n n
C4 C4 C4 C4 - C4 n C4 n C4 C4
C5 C5 C5 C5 n - n C5 n C5 C5
C6 C6 C6 C6 C6 C6 - C6 C6 C6 C6
C7 n n n n n n - n n n
C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 n C8 - C8 C8
C9 n n n n n n n n - n
C10 n n n n n n n n n -
3.4 Errors in flightplans and intents
An important safety issue is that for one single
aircraft there may be all kind of differences between
the flight intents on the ground and in the air, and
the ATCo and pilot awareness of those intents, i.e.:
- Tactical ATCo’s awareness of the flight intent
- Flightplan in the ATC system
- Pilot’s awareness of the flight intent
- Flightplan used by the FMS
To allow for these differences the following
mathematical modelling approach is adopted:
ATCo The tactical ATCo’s awareness of the flight
intent is assumed to be ATC’s true reference. The
quality of ATC’s true reference is in one of the
following two discrete modes: i) the true reference
provides separation, ii) the true reference does not
provide separation. In general the latter mode value
may be reached if an ATCo has made a knowledge-
based error.
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ATC The quality of the flightplan in the ATC
system may be in one of the following two discrete
modes: i) agrees with ATC’s true reference, ii)
differs from ATC’s true reference. The latter is due
to an ATCo input error, or an ATC database error.
Pilot The quality of the pilot’s awareness of ATC’s
true reference is in one of the following two discrete
modes: i) agrees with ATC’s true reference, ii)
differs from ATC’s true reference. The latter may
happen due to a clearance error. There are two types
of clearance errors: 1) intended clearance given to
wrong aircraft or 2) wrong clearance given to
intended aircraft. The causing factor may be with the
ATCo, or the pilot or both, and may be knowledge-
based, rule-based or skill-based.
FMS The quality of the flightplan used in the FMS
is in one of the following two discrete modes: i)
agrees with ATC’s true reference, ii) differs from
ATC’s true reference. The latter happens if pilot
awareness differs from ATC’s true reference or is
due to a pilot input error or an FMS data base error.
In elaborating the above it is assumed that all the
ATCo related errors may occur at random during
performance of subtasks A6, B6 or C6, (executive
action) where the frequency of occurrence depends
on the control mode the controller is in.
Furthermore, such errors may be detected and
corrected during rule monitoring subtasks A7, B7 or
C7, also depending on the control mode (e.g.
Amalberti and Wioland, 1997).
3.5 Mathematical model of tactical ATCo
In order to establish the connections with the other
ATM processes, in this subsection we describe the
mathematical model of the ATCo from an input-
output point of view. First we describe how
initiation of cognitive activity is modelled, then the
implementation of the task description and
controller performance is described. The Petri Net
of the tactical ATCo model is shown in Figure 2.
Initiation Three stimuli for ATCo cognitive activity
are identified: ATCo’s Anticipation, Automation
alerts and other actions. Activity triggering
situations that first have to be detected by the
operator (like an aircraft severely deviating from its
route) are not considered as an initiation stimulus,
since general sensing is modelled as a part of the
operators task and therefore the sensing activity has
to be initiated first. For the occurrence of certain
stimuli various other ATM modules may need to
function properly, such as e.g. the ATCo HMI and
surveillance for an Automation alert.
Within the Petri Net each stimulus is modelled as a
place, connected with one transition that fires if
initiation of the corresponding cognitive activity
takes place. These transitions produce two tokens:
one token returning to the stimulus place for future
generation of cognitive activity and one token in a
stack place. The stack places represent the situation
that the respective initiated cognitive activity has to
wait until the operator has completed other (more
important) tasks. The places Anticipation, Alert and
Other action represent initiation of cognitive activity
by own initiative, Automation alerts and other action
(e.g. a pilot request) respectively. Preconditions on
occurrence of these stimuli are modelled within the
respective transitions: if the preconditions are not
met the transition does not fire. For example: the
proper functioning of the ATCo HMI as a
precondition for the occurrence of an Automation
alert triggering ATCo cognitive activity is modelled
as a precondition for firing of the transition
connected to the Alert place.
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Figure 2: Petri Net of tactical ATCo model in
HOMEROS.
ATCo subtasks The ATCo task has been divided
into several sub-tasks which are each defined as the
combination of a scenario specific purpose and a
generically described cognitive activity. Three
context specific purposes are modelled: ATCo to
detect and correct deviations of aircraft from ATCo
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intentions, ATCo to react to Automation alerts
(initiated by Automation tools) and ATCo to
perform other control activities (initiated by own
initiative or through other actions). Each subtask is
represented by a place in the Petri Net, which is
named after the cognitive activity it represents. The
tokens then model cognitive activity on the subtask
that corresponds to the place that they reside in.
Some cognitive activities may be performed for
several purposes, leading to several places with the
same name. Below we describe the places with
respect to the cognitive activities that they represent.
The places named sensing represent the situation
that the ATCo is gathering information to improve
his picture of the traffic situation. The places named
integration represent the situation that the ATCo
incorporates the newly obtained information into
this mental picture. The place named
communication represents the situation that the
ATCo makes his knowledge of the situation
available to the pilots. The place named over-all
performance describes the evaluation of sector
performance as a whole. In the prediction place, the
ATCo extrapolates his picture of the traffic to the
future, while in the problem solving/planning place
he synthesizes solutions to possible (future)
problems. In the executive action place the operator
gives clearances to aircraft, followed by the
monitoring places where it is verified whether the
aircraft adhere to these clearances. In the out place
the tokens are collected after performance.
Whenever one subtask is logically performed after
performing another (e.g. prediction is performed
after integration) and they have the same scenario
specific purpose a transition is drawn between those
two subtasks.
Subtask scheduling We next incorporate the
scheduling rules. Scheduling depends on the relative
priority of a subtask and the possible concurrent
performance of two subtasks. The relative priority is
modelled as a colour type that is associated with the
tokens that represent cognitive activity on subtasks.
This colour type is a number 1,2,…. where low
numbers correspond to high priority. The priority
colours are up-dated whenever a new token is
initiated and when a token is collected in the out
place, according to a suitable set of assumptions.
According to the scheduling rules either the token
that has priority 1 is performed exclusively or the
tokens with priority 1 and 2 are performed
concurrently, with the token with priority 2 being the
secondary task.
We assume that for each subtask the time needed to
complete it has a certain probability density, given
the current control mode of the ATCo and possible
concurrent performance of another subtask. In the
Petri Net, the duration of performing a subtask is
modelled as a delay in the firing of the transition that
has the subtask as input place. Transitions with a
token in the input place that does not have priority 1
or 2 have ‘infinite’ delays. Transitions with a token
in the input place that has priority 1 has a delay
corresponding to the normal duration of the subtask,
given the control mode. Delays of transitions with a
token in the input place that has priority 2 either
have an ‘infinite’ delay or a delay that may be longer
than when the corresponding subtask is performed
exclusively. This depends on the extent to which the
subtasks with priority 1 and 2 may be performed
concurrently. Hence in the Petri Net, each transition
has a delay that is a function of the priority of the
token in the input place, the current control mode
and the place that the token with priority 1 resides
in.
The ATCo's executive actions (i.e. the clearances
given) are also modelled as a colourtype associated
with the tokens in the subtasks. This colourtype is a
set of paired numbers describing the type of
clearance given and the aircraft that the clearance is
given to. The decision to give no clearance at all is
also modelled as an executive action and has a
separate colour value. In the present model it is
assumed that the type of clearance given is
determined during the executive action subtask only
and that it depends on the control mode only. So the
firing of the transitions after the executive action
places also affects the Petri nets of other ATM
modules: completion of executive action means that
a decision to give a clearance to an aircraft has been
carried out and therefore the firing of these
transitions describe the ATCo control actions.
ATCo control modes In the model, ATCo
performance depends on the control mode,
scheduling rules and results in a clearance. In the
DCPN model of the ATCo two control modes are
identified, which are each represented by a place in
the Petri Net: the place named Tactical models the
situation that the controller has a relatively high
degree of control and the place named Opportunistic
models a relatively low degree of control. The
control mode may influence ATCo performance in
all aspects. The switching between control modes is
modelled by transitions between the Tactical and
Opportunistic places. The resulting subnet contains
one token, the place of which defines the current
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degree of control. The firing of the transitions
between the control modes depends on the number
of tokens in the stack places (indicating the
subjectively available time) and the number of times
that monitoring was followed by another executive
action during the last few minutes (indicating the
outcome of previous actions measured as the
number of clearances that the controller considers to
be insufficiently effective). Details for this type of
modelling appeared to be available through human
factors ATC expert knowledge.
4. REDUCTION OF THE ATCO MODEL
In this section we explain how the ATCo model that
was developed in Section 3 is reduced by applying
appropriate model aggregations. The motivation for
this reduction is that the complexity of the original
model results from a detailed modelling which is
judged to be unnecessary for the application at hand.
This makes the resulting reduced model interesting
in its own right.
First we explain how the subtasks are clustered into
a new set of subtasks, and how scheduling simplifies
accordingly. Second, the Petri Net for the ATCo
reduced model is given. Third, within an en-route
context we compare the relevant model
characteristics to verify that the model based on the
reduced task description is indeed an appropriate
approximation.
4.1 Aggregation of subtasks
In the previous section, Table 3 and Table 4 show
that due to the possibility of concurrent performance
of subtasks the number of required assumptions
concerning concurrent subtask performance equals
½n(n-1) and the number of required assumptions
concerning pre-emption equals n(n-1), with n the
number of identified subtasks. For the present 19
subtasks, this means a total of 342 rules concerning
task scheduling in the model. This large number of
rules may severely complicate the stochastic analysis
which is required for risk evaluation. Therefore, it is
desirable to reduce the complexity of the model
without compromising conservativeness or
psychological validity.
This reduction of the full model is achieved by
decreasing the level of detail at which the air traffic
control task is described and the way performance of
these tasks is scheduled according to single-task
performance.
The approach taken is to group the 19 subtasks into
a smaller number of clusters of subtasks. The
following clusters are identified:
Table 5: Clustering of the subtasks.
Cluster Initial subtasks
MonitoringA A1-A3
CommunicationA A5-A7
CommunicationB B5-B7
Complementary
CommunicationC
C4
CommunicationC C6
Co-ordinationC C8
MiscellaneousC C1-C3, C5, C7, C9, C10
Next, we need to identify how task scheduling at the
level of clusters of subtasks takes place. First,
concurrent performance of clusters of subtasks is
investigated using Table 3. This is done
conservatively using the principle that if one
combination of the clustered subtasks cannot be
performed concurrently, then the whole clusters of
subtasks cannot be performed concurrently.
Application of this principle yields the following
table:
Table 6: Concurrent performance of clusters of
subtasks, this table is derived from Table 3 and
Table 5.
MonA ComA ComB CpCC ComC CoorC MiscC
MonA - n n n n n y
ComA n - n n n n n
ComB n n - n n n n
CpCC n n n - n n n
ComC n n n n - n n
CoorC n n n n n - n
MiscC y n n n n n -
In a similar fashion, we identify a new table (Table
7) for the pre-emption between clusters of subtasks.
The following rule is applied: if any subtask in some
cluster A pre-empts all subtasks in some other
cluster B, then cluster A pre-empts cluster B.
Otherwise, cluster A does not pre-empt cluster B.
Table 7: Pre-emption between clusters of subtasks,
this table is derived from Table 4 and Table 5.
MonA ComA ComB CpCC ComC CoorC MiscC
MonA - n n n n n n
ComA ComA - n ComA ComA ComA ComA
ComB ComB ComB - ComB ComB ComB ComB
CpCC CpCC n n - n n CpCC
ComC ComC n n ComC - ComC ComC
CoorC CoorC n n CoorC n - CoorC
MiscC n n n n n n -
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Table 7 implies that the cluster MiscellC does not
pre-empt any other cluster. Moreover, MiscellC is
pre-empted by all other clusters, except
MonitoringA. Furthermore, it follows from Table 3
that MonitoringA and MiscellC can be performed
concurrently. From this we conclude that
performance of the subtasks in the cluster MiscellC
does not conflict with other subtasks at cluster level.
Since the cluster MiscellC itself does not contain
subtasks which are directly relevant for safe
separation, we can therefore discard this cluster in
the model without compromising conservativeness.
Therefore, we do not take into account this cluster in
the sequel.
Now inspect Table 6 and Table 7 again. Perhaps
surprisingly, we see that concurrent performance of
the remaining clusters of subtasks is not possible.
Moreover, the remaining pre-emption rules boil
down to a fixed priority list where MonitoringA has
lowest and CommunicationB has highest priority.
Apparently, similar principles underly Table 3 and
Table 4, although the construction of these tables
was done before and independently from the present
analysis.
We conclude that at the level of clustered tasks, the
complexity of the scheduling principle is reduced
significantly, without compromising
conservativeness. In summary, the main model
simplifications are
- Reduction from 19 subtasks to 6 clusters of
subtasks.
- Concurrent task performance is simplified into
single task performance.
- Pre-emption rules for each combination of
subtasks are simplified into a fixed priority list.
4.2 Reduced ATCo model
On the basis of the aggregation a reduced model of
the ATCo can now be developed. Six main ATCo
cognitive tasks are identified, which describe the
operator performance at a cognitive level. For each
task, we assumed a relative priority ranking, an
average duration and the percentage of his time that
the operator would spend on the task if
uninterrupted.
Table 8: Six main cognitive tasks.
Task Prio Description
MonitoringA 6 Visual anticipation and
detection of deviations from
the ATCo intention
CommunicationA 2 Communicate clearance with
an aircraft that deviated
severely visually from ATCo
intention
CommunicationB 1 Communicate clearance with
aircraft for which an
Automation alert was issued
Complementary
communicationC
5 General complementary
communication with pilots
CommunicationC 3 General communication of
executive action (i.e.
clearances)
Co-oordinationC 4 General coordination with
planner controller, controllers
of other sectors.
Two control modes are considered: Tactical and
Opportunistic, which reflect the degree of control.
In the Tactical mode, the ATCo takes his time and
makes little errors. In the Opportunistic mode, the
general tasks (marked subscript C) are performed
faster, but the chances on errors are also larger. The
switching between the control modes depends on the
subjectively available time (measured as the number
of tasks waiting to be performed) and the outcome
of previous actions (measured as the number of
corrective actions, i.e. CommunicationA and
CommunicationB, taken by the ATCo during the last
two minutes). If the subjectively available time is
short or if the outcome of previous actions is bad
then the ATCo switches to Opportunistic control
mode.
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HOMEROS
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ATCo erroneous clearances are taken into account
as follows: the ATCo may give a different clearance
than he intended to (e.g. switching heading and
speed), or he may give the clearance to a different
aircraft than he intended to (call-signs mixed up).
These errors are incorporated as random variations
in the ATCo actions. The error types are represented
as a colour value of the tokens in the place
Clearances.
The switching between modes is affected by several
other modules, such as Aircraft evolution,
Surveillance, ATC system, R/T local, R/T global,
Performance of pilot. Surveillance output (i.e. the
estimated aircraft state is input for the visual
detection of severe deviations by the ATCo. The
ATC system must be Working for the ATCo to be
able to do his job. The R/T modules and Pilot
module together form the Decision Making loop or
DM-loop. If all modules in the DM-loop are
Working, Relaxed, Delaying or Busy for a given
aircraft, then the ATCo is able to give a clearance to
that aircraft.
Pilot skill
Weather
Pilot
Aircraft
evolution
Communication
local
Communication
global
ATCo skill ATCo
Flight plan
ATC
Surveillance ATC system
Navigation
ground
Maintainance
ground
Navigation
aircraft
Aircraft
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Figure 4: Functional representation of conventional
ATC
4.3 Comparison against statistical data
Next we evaluated for the ATCo routine monitoring
concept the period to detect severe deviations such
that a comparison with available statistical data is
possible (George et al., 1973).
A full and reduced ATCo performance model was
developed on the basis of the cognitive principles
identified in Section 2 and integrated with
appropriate Petri Net models for the other relevant
components in conventional ATC (see Figure 4).
Comparison, in Figure 5, with the model based
results shows that the detection time results of both
the original and the reduced ATCo model agree
quite well with the measured data. It should be
noticed that in (George et al., 1973) only very few
detection times beyond 150 s were measured. This is
most probably due to the limited number of
measurements made in combination with the low
probability of such long detection times. Although
they have low probability, the longer detection times
add significantly to the risk, and Figure 5 shows that
model based results do extend to these low
probability values. We may conclude that both the
full and the reduced model curves agree quite well
with the statistical data. This clearly contributes to
gaining confidence in the model-based approach
taken.
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Figure 5: ATCo detection time of severe deviations
of the full model (line marked ‘+’), of the reduced
model (line marked ‘o’) and of statistical data,
(George et al., 1973), (dashed/dotted line, the dotted
part representing data based on less than 5
measurements)
Discussion of model reduction results
In this section we have shown how to derive a
reduced model of the ATCO performance from a
more detailed ATCo model which was developed in
Section 3. This reduction is based on using a less
detailed decomposition of the air traffic control task
and simplifying concurrent task performance into
single task performance (i.e. one task at a time).
From Figure 5 it appears that this reduced model
yields slightly more conservative ATCo detection
time results. Therefore we conclude that for the
particular application considered here, incorporation
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of concurrent task processing into the ATCo
performance model is not necessary for avoiding
overly conservative risk estimates. Obviously,
incorporation of concurrent processing into human
performance models may be essential for other
applications such as detailed workload assessment.
5. EXAMPLE APPLICATION
In this section we show TOPAZ based assessment
results for accident risk and ATCo actions, for an
hypothetical ATM scenario that consists of two en-
route traffic streams of RNP1 equipped traffic,
flying in opposite direction, all at one single flight
level.
5.1 Hypothetical ATC example
The rather hypothetical example has been developed
by Eurocontrol with the aim to learn understanding
how ATC influences accident risk, and how far the
nominal separation S between opposite RNP1 traffic
streams can safely be reduced. The specific details
of this scenario are:
- Straight route, with two traffic lanes
- ATCo expects all aircraft to stay on these lanes
- Parameter S denotes distance between the two
lanes (see Figure 6)
- Opposite traffic flows along each lane
- Aircraft fly at one flight level only
- Traffic flow per lane is 3.6 aircraft/hour
- All aircraft nominally perform RNP1
- None of the aircraft are TCAS equipped
- Target level of safety is 5.10-9 accidents/flight
hour.
- 15 aircraft per sector/ATCo
- There are no military aircraft
S
Figure 6: Opposite direction traffic in a dual lane
structure
This exemplar scenario is considered for the
following three ATM concepts:
• Procedural separation only. In this case there is
no ATC surveillance system. This is the type of
situation encountered with traffic over the North
Atlantic.
• STCA-only based ATC. In this case there is a
radar based surveillance and R/T
communication, but it is assumed that ATC is
doing nothing with this information unless its
STCA system issues an alert; thus assuming no
monitoring by ATCo.
• Routine monitoring based ATC. The same as in
B, but now without STCA system. Thus aircraft
deviations are only identified through routine
monitoring.
5.2 Accident risk
For each of the three ATM concepts the TOPAZ
methodology and tool set have been used to assess
accident risk for the above scenario, as a function of
the spacing parameter S. The accident risk result is
presented as the graph marked ‘ATCo routine
monitoring’ in Figure 7. In Figure 7, there also is a
horizontal line that represents the target level of
safety (TLS) which has been specified at 5 ⋅ 10-9
expected accidents per flight hour in (ICAO, 1998).
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Figure 7. Accident risk versus route spacing, the
graphs marked ‘No ATC’ and ‘STCA-only based
ATC’ have been taken from (Everdij et al., 1997).
The graph ‘ATCo routine monitoring’ is from (Daams
et al., 1999b). The TLS value used is defined in
(ICAO, 1998)
Qualitative uncertainty analysis
Absolute usage of the risk curves without taking into
consideration existing bias and/or uncertainty can
inspire undue conclusions. Due to a model based
quantitative risk assessment approach, it is possible
to bring the model assumptions made to the
-20-
NLR-TP-2001-053
foreground and subsequently perform an uncertainty
analysis of the model versus reality.
With the TOPAZ methodology, the starting point for
such uncertainty analysis consists of the following:
- description of nominal operation and procedures,
- list of hazards identified for the operation
considered,
- list of assumptions made when building the Petri
net,
- Petri net specification (local and interactions),
- list of parameters and values used during the
numerical evaluation, and their sources.
For the routine monitoring concept there are more
than 200 hazards (about 50% is human related),
about 25 model assumptions, and about 100 model
parameters (about 20% for the reduced ATCo
model).
The qualitative uncertainty analysis that can be
performed works as follows. First, for each hazard it
is specified how it is incorporated in the Petri Net or
not (due to a model assumption listed). The result is
that for each parameter and for each assumption the
related hazards are identified. The subsequent steps
are:
- Per assumption, perform a qualitative assessment
of its uncertainty impact on the risk,
- Per parameter value, perform a qualitative
assessment of the uncertainty in relation to the
applicable hazards,
- Per parameter value assess the impact of this
uncertainty impact on the risk.
At this moment, this qualitative uncertainty analysis
has not yet been applied to the TOPAZ evaluated
en-route examples. However, it has successfully
been applied in a Wake vortex risk assessment study
(see Kos et al., 2000). On the basis of this
experience we expect that the main contribution to
uncertainty will come from unmodelled hazards
(either due to
model assumptions or due to missing hazards),
rather then from parameter value uncertainty. For
the curves in Figure 7 this means that for the time
being they should be interpreted in a relative way
only.
Analysis of risk curves
Inspection of Figure 7 yields that the TLS is reached
for a route spacing of about 24 km (13 Nm), which
is a significant improvement of the values of the No
ATC curve (TLS reached at about 58 km (~32 Nm))
and the STCA-only based ATC curve (TLS reached
at about 40 km (~22 Nm)). Obviously, for busy
fixed route situations over the continent, procedureal
separation is not very helpful. STCA-only based
ATC neither helps a lot. The improvement provided
by the routine monitoring shows that it is much more
effective in safely managing deviations from
centerline than reacting to STCA alerts only.
Apparently, STCA really is a safety net only.
We also observe that the risk reduction provided by
monitoring based ATC increases as route spacing
increases. This is in contrast to the STCA-only
based control strategy, where the ATCo prevents a
fixed ratio of the deviating aircraft that reach the
other route from collision. The reason for this
increasing risk reduction is that the number of severe
deviations that are detected before the aircraft
reaches the other route increases faster with route
spacing than the decrease in the number of deviating
aircraft that reach the other route. Hence, the slope
of the risk figure depends on the slope of the ATCo
detection time instead of the slope of the non-
nominal lateral deviation probability density
function. Consequently, accident risk may be further
reduced by changing the ATM design and in
particular the role of the controller such that the
ATCo detection time is improved.
Safety criticality analysis
Further evaluation showed that safety criticality lies
with the Sharp turn type of deviations. This is
caused by the fact that during the Sharp turns the
aircraft deviates from the route much faster than in
the case of a general Non-nominal deviation. We
evaluated for S = 24 km (13 Nm) the risk involved
with the Sharp turns to be a factor 15 higher than for
the Non-nominal deviations.
In the present model, the Sharp turns are caused by
erroneous ATCo clearances and aircraft flightplan
errors, whereas the Non-nominal deviations are
caused by degraded navigation systems, degraded
aircraft systems etc. Hence from the safety criticality
result we conclude that the most risky situations
originate in the human factor rather than in degraded
performance of technical systems.
5.3 ATCo effort and effect
The ATC effort is related to the number of ATC
actions normalised by the theoretical minimum of
ATC actions required for averting all accidents (i.e.
one action per accident that would occur if there
were no ATC). This is approximately equal to the
number of ATC actions required to avert one
accident (as almost all potential accidents should be
averted).
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Effort:
)
accidents Averted
actions ATC
(
ATC without Accidents,
actions ATC
a ≈=ρ
Next we express the ATC effect as the factor of
accident risk reduction achieved by ATC:
Effect:
ATC with Accidents,
ATC without Accidents,
b =ρ
Graphs for the metrics ρa and ρb for STCA-only
based ATC and routine monitoring are given in
Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Effort ρa and effect ρb for routine
monitoring (+ graph) and STCA-only based ATC (o
graph)
From the ρb curves in Figure 8 we conclude that the
monitoring strategy yields a better risk reduction for
all spacings. Secondly, inspection of the ρa graphs
yields that for small spacings monitoring requires
even less effort than STCA-only. For larger spacings
monitoring requires more effort than STCA-only.
We conclude that for small spacings, monitoring is
to be preferred (more effect, less effort), while for
larger spacings the situation is less clear (more
effect, but also more effort).
A remark should be made concerning spacings
below 2 Nm (where the ρb has negative values for
monitoring). Notice that these very low spacings are
not realistic for the monitoring concept, since for
these spacings aircraft may collide while remaining
within the safe boundary around the lanes (whence
the ATCo does not take action to prevent these
collisions). We therefore disregarded these very
small spacings.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper applied state of the art psychology in
human cognition/performance modelling for
application to accident risk modelling. This led to
the development of mathematical human
cognition/performance models for a tactical ATCo
in a conventional en-route ATC situation. This
model is shown to be of great use in the evaluation
of accident risks for an ATM scenario with the
tactical ATCo performing routine monitoring to
detect and correct for severely deviating aircraft.
6.1 Validation issues
In this work we took a model-based approach
towards the assessment of concepts such as accident
risk and controllability in ATM situations. This
makes the approach a formal one: for the model,
accident risk and ATCo effort and effect indicators
are unambiguously defined. If numerical evaluations
of the model are carried out in a verifiably correct
way, then the validity of the results depends on the
verifiability of the model only.
The main problem thus is how to verify that the
model ‘matches’ reality sufficiently well, with
respect to the intended use of the model. It should be
stressed that an absolute ‘match’ is not feasible,
however this is also not neccesary. Instead a case
that the model is sufficiently realistic for its
purposes should be built, by testing both the
assumptions made during model development and
relevant characteristics of the eventual model. The
confidence in the model should then be based on the
quality of the arguments for its validity (i.e. the ‘test
results’). This model validation approach is
currently under development. On the basis of the
human cognition modelling and the controllability
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results in the present report, we recognise a
contribution to this approach which consists of
comparing relevant model characteristics with
human-in-the-loop measurements in the case of
human controllability evaluation. Such comparison
should always be treated with care as the results may
be sensitive to the context.
For the present model, three tests of its validity have
been carried out: in (Daams et al., 1998b) the human
performance modelling approaches that underly the
ATCo model used have been shown to be
sufficiently powerful to explain ATCo related
hazards in en-route ATM. Secondly, in Figure 5
ATCo detection time which is a relevant model
characteristic for accident risk was compared against
controller-in-the-loop based data from the literature.
Thirdly, during the whole development of the ATCo
model a Human Factors specialist has been actively
involved and the results have been reviewed by an
operational expert. Obviously, further confidence
building can and should be done, e.g. on the basis of
detailed reviews with a number of experts and
comparison of a range of model characteristics with
additional empirical data.
6.2 Human cognition modelling
When designing advanced ATM, it is important to
understand the safety issues already at a conceptual
level. Because of the extreme low probability of
accidents in existing ATM practice, statistical data
from practical situations is limited and analysing
accident reports alone is not sufficient to understand
safety at the level of the interactions between the
various ATM components. For advanced ATM
designs, data concerning unsafe events may even be
lacking at all. Therefore, some kind of modelling
approach is required to optimize for capacity and
separation criteria without compromising safety.
Since in about eighty percent of the reported
accidents humans were part of the cause, it is
imperative to properly incorporate the human factor
into the models used for risk assessment. In this
report, we therefore investigated three
complementary psychological models, and we
combined them into a single mathematical model of
a tactical ATCo in a conventional en-route context.
Because monitoring activity is typically performed
as an integrated part of the tactical ATCo job, it is
necessary to also take into account other ATCo
activities that may interfere with monitoring. This
was accomplished through our contextual model of
ATCo performance that takes into account the
interfering tasks at a cognitive level, thus
minimizing the level of modelling detail required to
take into account the interfering tasks. We also
showed that this advanced ATCo performance
model can be included in an accident risk model for
the conventional en-route ATC situation considered,
and that the time needed for the ATCo to detect a
severe deviation as predicted by the model agrees
rather well with statistical data. We also
demonstrated that we could use the model to
evaluate accident risk for the ATM scenario, and
that the results provide valuable insight and
feedback to ATM designers.
We conclude that the use of advanced psychological
models in accident risk modelling is feasible, thus
extending the applicability of the accident risk
modelling approach to situations where isolated
models of individual human actions do not suffice.
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ACRONYMS
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATCo Air Traffic Controller
ATM Air Traffic Management
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
DCPN Dynamically Coloured Petri Net
DM Decision Making
FMS Flight Management System
FPM Flight Path Monitoring
HEART Human Error Assessment and
Reduction Technique
HEI Human Error Identification
HEP Human Error Probability
HMI Human Machine Interface
HOMEROS Human Operator Models to Evaluate
Reliability, Organisation and Safety
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PSF Performance Shaping Factors
R/T Radio/Telephony
RNP Required Navigation Performance
SLIM Success Likelihood Index
Methodology
STCA Short Term Conflict Alert
TCAS Traffic Collision Avoidance System
THERP Technique for Human Error Rate
Prediction
TLS Target Level of Safety
TOPAZ Traffic Organization and Perturbation
AnalyZer
